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Abstract 
 
From institutional, resource dependence and organizational ecology perspectives, there are 
two initial requirements for organizational survival: 1) there are sufficient resources in the 
niche, and 2) the organization can obtain these resources. A new concept, saturation, is 
created to measure the scarcity of resources by analyzing its influence on survival. However, 
organizational success also depends on organizational characteristics, which can hinder the 
securing of the resources necessary for survival. This article researches ownership structure as 
an organizational characteristic. These influences are tested utilizing data from a population of 
1298 Spanish olive oil mills. 
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Main text 
The struggle for organizational survival is considered as competition between 
organizations to obtain the resources available in the environment (McKelvey and 
Aldrich, 1983, p. 115). It is implicitly understood that there are resources that are 
essential for an organization to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 41). Competition 
also intensifies when necessary resources become scarcer (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 
p. 940). The securing of resources will depend on the environment’s characteristics, the 
population (Hannan, 1989; Barnett and Amburgey, 1990) and/or the strategies used by 
organizations to obtain them (Oliver, 1991). The idea of measuring the quantity of 
resources necessary for a population to survive is covered by the concept of niche, 
which is defined as the space of n-dimensional resources where a population can exist 
(Hutchinson, 1957). However, no attempts have been made to measure this concept 
directly. Generally, it has been taken as being constant, or it has been assumed to vary 
in terms of population size, or it has been measured by much more global environmental 
variables such as economic indices and the frequency of good years (Carroll, 1985; 
Hannan, 1989; Barnett and Amburgey, 1990). 
In light of this situation, the aim of this paper is to measure the limitation of resources 
available in the niche and its influence on survival, for which we will create a new 
concept called saturation. We define saturation as a measure of the scarcity of the 
existing resources that allow a population to survive. Once the limitations of the 
resources available in the environment have been analyzed, further analyses of the 
possibility of access to these resources will be made, depending on a population 
characteristic, on concentration, or on the relationship between the sizes of 
organizations that make up the population (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 50). Lastly, 
further analysis will be made, to see if certain organizational characteristics, or certain 
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strategies designed to secure the supply of resources, are successful in terms of the fight 
for survival. 
These objectives will be achieved firstly by developing the theoretical background. 
Later, the population used will be described—the olive oil production industry in Spain 
from 1944 to 1998. Following this, the statistical methodology used will be explained in 
detail. Lastly, the results obtained will be discussed, and we will set out our 
conclusions. 
 
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
When resources in a niche are abundant, organizations have no difficulty in obtaining 
the quantities of these that they need to survive. Organizational vulnerability arises 
when the niche does not guarantee the supply of resources needed to continue running 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 47). In this situation, the greater the scarcity, the greater 
will be the fight to obtain these resources; that is, there will be more competition within 
the population (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, p. 940). However, to speculate about this 
reasoning, we must first know if we are able to calculate the level of resource limitation 
or abundance. 
Traditionally, the effect of competition on survival has been studied through population 
size (density, mass) and by assuming that the resources available in the environment 
(niche carrying capacity) were constant, varied in terms of the population size, or were 
estimated using environmental variables such as economic indices (Carroll, 1985; 
Hannan, 1989; Barnett and Amburgey, 1990). Other types of approach have not proved 
much better, given that the characteristics of the niche are taken exogenously, and the 
objective being sought is to analyze what characteristics the organizations possess to 
face up to a given environment or how these organizations act to adapt to it (Oliver, 
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1991). That is, the concept of abundance or scarcity of resources in the niche, despite 
being a basic assumption of several theories, has not really been identified explicitly. 
To fill this gap, we have created a measurement, which we have called saturation, that 
gives the availability of niche resources. This new measurement is defined as the 
difference between the potential demand of resources that members of a population may 
create and the volume of existing resources in the niche. The higher the measurement 
(positive values), the more saturated the niche will be, thereby resulting in greater 
scarcity of resources. To put it another way, if there is more demand than can be 
supplied by the environment, then there will not be enough resources to meet the 
population’s needs. On the other hand, the lower the measurement (negative values), the 
less saturation there will be, which will mean a greater abundance of resources. 
Given that scarcity of resources intensifies the fight among organizations to obtain 
them, increasing the saturation level of the niche will raise competition at an ever-
increasing rate. If competition is directly and positively related to the probability of 
organizational death (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989), then it is possible to foresee a 
link between the niche saturation level and the probability of organizational failure, as is 
established in the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the saturation level of the niche implies an increase in the 
probability of organizational failure. 
 
However, not all organizations compete in the same way and, in the event of scarcity or 
abundance of resources, there may be certain characteristics of the population that make 
it easier or more difficult to obtain the resources and, therefore, influence the probability 
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of survival. One of these characteristics could be the relationship with size that exists 
among all the organizations of a population:  
 
“Within any area of activity, patterns of resource use will tend to be specialized to segments of the size 
distribution” (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, p. 945). 
 
According to this reasoning, organizations compete more intensely with those that are 
of a similar size, given that, in this case, they use similar strategies and organizational 
structures and identical sets of environmental resources (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, p. 
945; Hannan, Ranger-Moore and Banaszak-Holl, 1990; Baum and Mezias, 1992). This 
implies that, in a perfectly competitive market, where the number of organizations tends 
to be infinite and their relative size tends towards zero, the concentration index1 will be 
lower and, therefore, competition will be greater. However, if concentration rises, the 
difference in organizational size will also increase, which would imply less competition 
and, therefore, less probability of failure. 
The impact of concentration on organizational survival is also considered in resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 50-51); however, Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) draw completely opposite conclusions to those developed in 
organizational ecology. This theory assumes that the concentration of the control of 
resources by a small number of organizations, together with the importance of these 
resources, determines the dependence of one organization on another (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978, p. 51). That is, if the concentration index rises, most of the resources 
come under the control of a few organizations, which in turn will influence the life 
chances of the rest because there would be fewer resources available to share among 
them. 
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As we have seen, the two previous explanations allow us to draw opposite conclusions. 
For this reason, we formulate Hypothesis 2 on the organizational ecology approach and, 
simultaneously, the alternative hypothesis based on reasoning derived from the resource 
dependence theory:  
 
Hypothesis 2 (alternative): A rise in the concentration level implies a reduction 
(increase) in the probability of organizational failure. 
 
Finally, depending on the theoretical approach considered, the organization may or may 
not be in a position to face up to the environment. In this respect, we can analyze the 
organizational characteristics or performance strategies that may make securing 
resources and, therefore, survival, easier. 
Although, in this paper, we are not interested in analyzing the influence of ownership 
structure on survival, this could be a criterion used in the classification of organizational 
forms with distinctive characteristics (Aldrich and Marsden, 1988; Meyer and Zucker, 
1989). In this way, by taking into account ownership structure, it is possible to 
determine two organizational forms: stock form and mutual form (Barnett and Carroll, 
1987; Haveman, 1992; Barron, West and Hannan, 1994, 1998). Both forms differ in 
numerous ways, such as in the nature and motivation of those who make up the 
organization; the governance system (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994), the support 
received from public administration (Barron, West and Hannan, 1998), profit-sharing, 
and the taxation status (Barron, 1995; Barron, West and Hannan, 1998). However, in 
reference to the topic developed in this paper, the securing of resources necessary for 
the organizations also has distinctive characteristics that could well make survival easier 
for one organizational form as opposed to another. 
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One fundamental characteristic that differentiates both organizational forms is the 
double role of member and supplier (or customer) on the part of the owners of the 
mutual organization. This implies that the member participates in the organization as a 
supplier and, as a result, has greater identity and commitment towards it. Moreover, it 
would be necessary to consider that cooperative principles applicable in the mutual form 
reaffirm this level of commitment by obliging members to participate in the 
organization’s production process (International Cooperative Alliance, 1995). That is, 
the member has an exclusive commitment to the organization, preventing any other 
outside activity. This implies that the organization would have the supply of resources 
guaranteed by all of the supplier-members, as well as competing under the same 
conditions for the rest of the resources, which are provided by other types of suppliers. 
That is, mutual organizations, having their supply of resources guaranteed by the 
supplier-members, would reduce the uncertainty created by environmental conditions, 
thereby increasing their life chances (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In the same way, the 
exclusive commitment of the members presumes that these organizations would not 
have to compete fiercely to secure resources, thereby reducing their probability of 
failure. 
However, the advantages of the mutual form do not stop here as far as the obtaining of 
resources goes. According to institutional theory, the increase in embeddedness of a 
population in its institutional environment facilitates, with time, its growth and survival 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983). This supposition is also confirmed 
in organizational ecology, according to which the said link increases a population’s 
chances of surviving and growing, and thus improves the capacity of the population 
members to mobilize resources and increase their legitimacy (Hannan and Carroll, 
1992, p. 41). In fact, various papers confirm that links with the institutional environment 
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increase organizational survival chances (Singh, Tucker and House, 1986; Miner, 
Amburgey and Stearns, 1990; Baum and Oliver, 1991, 1992). In addition, institutions 
establish incentives to benefit certain sets of organizations (Ingram and Inman, 1996). 
The link with the institutional environment can be seen both in the incentives received 
by the mutual form (Barron, West and Hannan, 1998), and in the favorable legislation 
they are granted (Ingram and Simons, 2000). By combining all of these theoretical 
explanations, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The organizations making up the mutual form are less likely to fail than 
those in the stock form. 
 
 
The olive oil production industry 
To test these hypotheses, we have used the olive oil production industry in the province 
of Jaén (Spain) from 1944 to 1998. 
This industry was chosen because the province is a leader in the production of olive oil, 
with an average annual production of 312,000 t of olive oil, which constitutes 13.8% 
and 17.7% of world and European production, respectively (Consejo Oleicola 
Internacional, 2001). This prominence goes back as far as the middle ages, to the 
twelfth century, when this province was one of the outstanding centers of olive oil 
production on a worldwide scale (Comet, 1996, p. 50). 
The olive oil production industry is a suitable industry to use to achieve the objectives 
of this paper because of this population’s unitary character. That is, the organizations of 
this industry—oil mills (“almazaras”)—share the consequences of organizational 
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success or failure because they are similarly affected by changes in the environment 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989). 
Its activity is centered on extraction, marketing and storage of virgin olive oil. However, 
during the study period, marketing has been undertaken through middle-men, and has 
been given little importance as an internal organizational activity. Only now are these 
organizations becoming aware of the advantages to be gained by making this an internal 
activity (Ernst & Young Asesores, 1992, p. 175). In the same way, storage is a 
necessary activity, but it does not entail a great consumption of either human or material 
resources, and could be considered an irrelevant activity. Therefore, as the extraction 
stage is the fundamental activity of an oil mill, the differences between the mills at this 
stage are determined by their internal characteristics (such as the extraction technology 
used, the power installed, the number of employees and the milling capacity). The 
significance of this stage implies that the olive (sole raw material) is the critical resource 
of the niche in which the oil mills operate. No other relevant resource can be found. A 
specialized work force is not required. The customers are large companies that work in 
an oligopoly and release the olive oil onto the final market. To sum up, competition in 
this industry is generated by the need to obtain a basic resource: the olive. 
The quantity of this resource (or niche size) has risen during the twentieth century for 
three reasons: 1) there has been an increase in the area of olive grove cultivated, 2) 
farmers have improved agronomic management (Zambrana-Pineda, 1987, p. 88–89), 
and 3) irrigated areas have been extended (Civantos-López-Villalta, 1997). Despite 
these circumstances, the biological nature of this resource means that its transformation 
process depends on a biological system involving many factors that are difficult to 
predict and control, such as climate and diseases. 
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This aspect creates great uncertainty in this sector, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
miscalculating the estimates and plans made by companies. The oil mill cannot 
anticipate the size of the next crop or its production quality, the market price or the costs 
of production, and this situation is made more difficult by the enormous differences in 
the quantity of production from one year to the next because of the changeable nature of 
the olive tree. In Figure 1, constant fluctuations in the size of the niche can be seen 
during the study period. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
What is more, the rapid rotting of the fruit from the moment it is harvested means that it 
must undergo an immediate transformation process to convert it into oil so that its 
quality does not suffer and its market value is not reduced (Uceda-Ojeda and Hermoso-
Fernández, 1997). This forces the oil mills to install adequate milling capacity. 
However, the difficulty in predicting the exact amount of fruit available in any 
particular harvest and the need to guarantee its rapid transformation forces the oil mills 
to install productive capacities according to the maximum fruit delivery. 
If we add to the previously mentioned factors the technological change undergone in the 
extraction systems used in this industry, we can see how these organizations have 
increased their size over the years. To measure the size, or potential resource demand, 
we have used the milling capacity installed by the oil mill, with the capacity of raw 
material transformation being the most suitable indicator to quantify the individual size 
in the agricultural sector (Ministerio de Agricultura, 1979). In Figure 2, we graphically 
represent the aggregate size (or population mass) of the oil mills that were operating in 
each of the years studied. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
From this graph, we can deduce a more or less regular growth in the population mass, or 
the potential resource demand, during the entire period studied. Nevertheless, this 
growth is more notable after the 1980s because of the effort made by these companies to 
modernize (technological change) (Civantos-López-Villalta, 1997, p. 126-127). 
The biological nature of the resource used by the oil mills requires the material to be 
rapidly transformed and, therefore, their installations need to be located close to the 
suppliers. This means that the number of organizations (or density) in this industry is 
high (Figure 3).  
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The density reached its maximum in 1954 with 1091 oil mills, and it remained close to 
this level until the end of the 1960s; it then declined significantly until it became stable 
after the 1980s. 
By taking the variables used in Figures 1 and 2, we determined the saturation of the 
niches where these organizations operate. On the one hand, the niche size shows the 
volume of resources that the environment provides for the oil mills, and on the other, 
the population mass represents the potential resource demand made by the oil mills in 
terms of the milling capacities installed. 
The difference between this potential demand and the resources available at any given 
time reflects the saturation or scarcity levels of the niche. If the difference is positive, it 
means that there are not enough resources in the niche for these organizations to take 
maximum advantage of their production installations. If, on the other hand, it is 
negative, there would be a surplus of resources in the niche, and the organizations 
would have no difficulty in obtaining the resources necessary. 
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Figure 4 represents the evolution of the saturation level of the niche during the study 
period and shows a somewhat erratic performance due to the growth in the size of the 
oil mills and the fluctuations in the size of the annual olive harvest. Nevertheless, we 
can deduce that the oil mills have developed their activity in a saturated and, therefore, 
very competitive niche. For most of the years, we can see how the potential to absorb 
resources is far greater than the resources available in the niche. Only in six years was 
there a surplus of resources that were not used by the organizations in this population. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
To complete the description of this industry and, given the evolution of the number of 
participants (Figure 3) and their aggregate size (Figure 4), we must also consider the 
evolution of concentration levels. Figure 5 shows the low concentration level in this 
industry. Nevertheless, there was a considerable increase in concentration after the 
1970s as mills became larger and the total number of mills declined. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Of the organizational forms that make up the olive oil production industry, the one that 
stands out is the mutual form, where members, who mainly belong to cooperatives, mill 
their own olives. This form, which predominates on both a national and Andalusian 
level, is even more predominant in the province of Jaén where it is responsible for 65% 
of the province’s production of olive oil (Mozas-Moral, 1998, p. 93). 
However, its importance has evolved over a period. According to the database designed 
to carry out this research, an average of 8.2% of the oil mills were of the mutual form in 
the 1950s, whereas, in the 1990s, this percentage rose to 61.67%. 
In the oil mills of the mutual form, the supplier and owner are the same person. Given 
that one role does not exclude the other, the members take on the role of supplier and 
owner from the moment they form part of the oil mill. The members (the farmers) are 
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owners, since the running of the oil mill depends on the agreements that they reach and, 
at the same time, they are suppliers as they provide the main raw material necessary to 
operate. Nevertheless, of the two roles, the dominant role is that of supplier, given that 
the income received by farmers comes from the business done with the oil mill as 
suppliers (Lucas, 1972). 
Moreover, according to cooperative principles, members are bound to work exclusively 
in the organization of which they are members, and are obliged to give over their entire 
production to this organization. 
 
METHOD 
Data 
To achieve the objectives set, a database was built containing information on 1298 oil 
mills; that is, all the oil mills that have operated in the province of Jaén at some time 
during the period 1944–1998. Of these data, 114 are left-censored data and 487 right-
censored data (Lawless, 1982; Cox and Oakes, 1984). The disappearance of an oil mill 
was considered to have occurred when it stopped operating, but not when its ownership 
or trade name changed, since, in these cases, there were no justifiable reasons to 
conclude that the whole organization is transformed. In fact, it could continue to use the 
same procedures and routines (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Ingram and Inman, 1996). 
There were 11 mergers taken as disappearances in the years in wich they ocurred. The 
database has been built from the following sources. 
Register of agricultural firms held at the provincial office in Jaén of the Agricultural 
and Fisheries Department of the Andalusian Regional Government. This register is the 
main information source for these databases and provided the following variables: date 
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of birth, date of disbandment (if applicable), milling capacity installed, ownership 
structure, the type of production ownership and the type of technology employed. 
Register of cooperatives held at the provincial office in Jaén of the Trade and Industry 
Department of the Andalusian Regional Government. The information acquired from 
this register was used to test the information obtained from the previous register on the 
date of constitution and, if applicable, the date of the disbandment of oil mill 
cooperatives. 
Agricultural Statistics Yearbooks published from 1946 to 1980 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and, after that year, by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. 
From these yearbooks, we have taken the annual oil harvests in the province of Jaén. 
Bernal, A.M. (1994), Ministerial Orders and Royal Decrees that annually set the price 
of electricity. From these sources, we calculated the cost of electric power. We obtained 
the price for the years 1944–1992 from Bernal (1994) and, for 1992 onwards, we used 
the price from the Ministerial Orders and Royal Decrees published in the Official 
Gazette by the Ministry of Industry and Energy. 
 
 
Variables 
Saturation level of niche. This variable reflects the level of resources used in the niche 
at all times. The niche saturation level was determined as the difference between the 
potential demand of resources that may be made by the oil mills in terms of their 
milling capacities installed (that is, in terms of the aggregate organizational sizes or 
population mass) and the annual olive harvests (that is, the size of the niche). 
Level of concentration. This variable was measured using the Herfindahl index and was 
chosen because: 1) it verifies the properties required from the concentration indices 
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(Hannah and Kay, 1997; Encauoua and Jacquemin, 1980), 2) it has already been used as 
a measure of concentration in ecological literature (Barnett and Carroll, 1987; Wholey, 
Christianson and Sanchez, 1992), and 3) it is a suitable indicator of concentration since 
it gives more importance to the disparity of sizes between organizations than to the 
number of organizations. 
Mutual organizations. To identify the influence of the ownership structure on the 
probability of failure, we introduced a dummy variable that that was one (value 1) when 
the oil mill was integrated in the mutual form, and zero (value 0) when that was not the 
case (Rao and Neilsen, 1992; Barron, West and Hannan, 1998). 
The possible existence of effects provoked by variables other than exogenous variables 
makes observations of the direct influence between the exogenous and endogenous 
variables more difficult. For this reason, two types of control variables were introduced. 
One type incorporated specific characteristics of the organizations, which, despite not 
being analyzed in this paper, affect the probability of organizational failure. The other 
type covered variables that represented at all times the environmental situation that, 
without being representative of the most immediate setting or niche, may affect 
organizational survival. 
Organizational age. This variable was defined as the number of years since the date of a 
oill mill´ s founding. It is a necessary control variable to study organizational mortality 
(Carroll and Hannan, 2000). 
Type of production ownership. Given that Boone, Bröcheler and Carroll (2000) 
discovered that whether production ownership fell on one or various owners affects the 
probability of organizational failure, a dummy variable was created that tells us, at 
every moment, if the oil mill is operated by the owner (value 1) or if it is operated under 
lease (value 0). 
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Organizational size. We identified the installed milling capacity as a variable 
representing the size of each oil mill following consideration of the relation between 
size and capacity (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994, p. 394–395). Within this line of 
investigation, there have been empirical studies of the storage capacity of wineries 
(Delacroix, Swaminathan and Solt, 1989; Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991; 
Swaminathan, 1995), production capacity of breweries (Carroll and Swaminathan, 
1992), license restrictions on the enrollment of day-care centers (Baum and Oliver, 
1991) and room-counts of hotels (Baum and Mezias, 1992). We could also consider that 
the installed production capacity is the best measure of size, given that it takes into 
account the space of the niche occupied by each organization (Winter, 1990). 
Type of technology. Technology influences on the performance of organizations, and 
signs of such influence are reflected in mortality rates (Barnett, 1990; Suárez and 
Utterback, 1995; Carroll and Teo, 1996). To control possible variations in the 
probability of failure according to the type of technology used, we introduced two 
dummy variables: obsolete and advanced technology. These variables take a value of 1 
if the oil mill used either of the two types of technology mentioned, and 0 in the 
opposite case. Both variables were introduced since both may exist simultaneously in 
the same organization, although in different production lines. 
We introduced the following environment control variables:  
Electric energy cost. Electric energy is the power source that supplies the production 
system of an oil mill. This variable takes into account the cost of this supply in Pesetas 
per kW/h. It therefore expresses the variable unit cost derived from the consumption of 
electric power. This variable has been introduced following the approach in other papers 
of estimating vital rates to monitor the incidence of the main organization cost (Barnett 
and Carroll, 1987; Mascarenhas, 1996). 
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Population density. This variable allows to control one additional source of 
intrapopulation competition. In the density dependence model (Hannan, 1989), the 
intensity of competition varies according to the number or density of organizations in a 
population. Population density was measured as the total number of oil mills existing at 
the start of each year. To allow for a nonmonotonic effect, density was modeled as 
quadratic by including both population density and population density squared, with 
squared term divided by 1000 for rescaling (Hannan and Carroll, 1992). 
Analysis 
To carry out the necessary tests, we modeled oil mill failure using r(t), the 
instantaneous risk of failing. This hazard rate of failure is defined as the limiting 
probability of a failure between t and t + Dt, given thath the oil mill was operating at t, 
calculed over Dt:  
t
t) at operatingÄt tt, ailuref
tr t D
+
= ®D
/(
Prlim)( 0  
 
Parametric estimates of the hazard rate require assumptions about the effect of 
time (in these models, age) on failure. We used the piecewise-exponential model, which 
is a flexible approach to modeling the influence of age on firm failure. We estimate a 
piecewise-exponential model of the form: 
Xe tr b=)(  
where b  the associated vector of coefficients and X the matrix of exogenous and control 
variables. If b  has a positive sign the organization’s failure probability will increase. On 
the contrary, if the sign is negative this probability will be reduced.  
Following the methodology explained, in the stcox procedure the statistical 
package Stata 6.0 (Stata Corporation, 1999) the values of the different variables were 
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introduced in one-year spells and the b  coefficients were estimated by maximum-
likelihood. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 shows the basic statistics and correlations between exogenous and control 
variables. Table 2 shows the models built to test the influence of the exogenous 
variables on the probability of organizational failure. The first three show the isolated 
impact of each of the variables, and the fourth shows the influence of each variable 
when the incidence of the remaining exogenous variables is controlled. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In the first model of Table 2, we can see that the saturation of the niche has a positive 
and significant influence on the probability of death of the oil mills. This result suggests 
that, as resources of the niche are depleted, competition rises at an increasing rate, 
which in turn increases risk of failure of the industry’s organizations. This result would 
support the first hypothesis, as suggested in the theoretical background. 
Model 2 shows the positive and significant impact that concentration level has on the 
probability of failure. That is, an increase in concentration seems to increase the 
probability of organizational death, which is consistent with the dependence resource 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Therefore, we would accept the second hypothesis 
(alternative). 
The results achieved in Model 3 suggest that the organizations making up the mutual 
form benefit from more guarantees of survival. This also suggests that we accept the 
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third hypothesis. That the duties of an owner and supplier coincide in the same person, 
together with the exclusive commitment on the part of the members, supposes a 
guarantee of the supply of the resources that these organizations need for their 
operations. Likewise, the institutional support received by this organizational form 
could have contributed to the attainment of these results. 
In Model 4, where all the exogenous and control variables are included, practically the 
same results are achieved as in the three models analyzed individually, in relation to 
both the value of the coefficients and their degree of significance. 
On the other hand, the organizational and environmental control variables significantly 
influenced mortality rates in the olive oil production industry. 
In all the models, we can see that there is a significant negative relationship between the 
exploitation of the oil mill by the owner and its probability of failure. Also, we can 
observe how the size of the organization has a highly significant negative impact on its 
probability of death. This result coincides with previous research, which indicates that 
the increase in size reduces the risk of organizational failure (Carroll and Hannan, 
2000). Another variable that, at the organizational level, has significant influence is the 
type of technology employed. Oil mills that use the most advanced technology in their 
production systems suffer lower death rates. This effect is evident in all the models and 
is due to the reduction in extraction costs and the extraction of more final product 
because of the use of such technology (Hermoso-Fernández et al., 1994).  
Regarding the impact of environmental control variables, it is not possible to deduce the 
influence of the cost of electric power on the probability of failure, since the sign 
obtained in the models is both positive and negative. However, density significantly 
affects mortality rates in this industry, which reveals a U-shaped non-monotonic design 
in the relationship that links this variable to the aforementioned rates.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
We believe that, for a set of organizations to survive, two conditions are required: 1) the 
niche must have resources available, and 2) organizations must be able to obtain them. 
These two premises coincide with the theoretical reasoning developed by the three main 
theories relating to this environment: institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and organizational ecology 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977). However, we believe that these theories have not been 
empirically and specifically tested up to now. In this paper, we have developed a new 
concept, namely saturation, that allows us to measure approximately the scarcity (or 
abundance) of existing resources in the niche. Subsequently, we also analyzed how 
saturation can affect organizational survival. However, organizations must also be able 
to obtain resources, and the capacity to do so will be influenced by several factors. In 
the theoretical background, two were studied: a population characteristic, concentration, 
which identifies the degree of aggression and competition of the organizations to secure 
resources by taking into account their size differences, and an organizational 
characteristic, the organization’s ownership structure, which can make access to certain 
resources easier. 
To test these two lines of thought we used the olive oil production industry since its 
characteristics allow us to reduce the study of an n-dimensional space of resources or 
niche to just one particular resource: the quantity of olives. 
Our results suggest that the theories mentioned are correct. That is, the scarcity of 
resources is detrimental to organizational survival and, moreover, those organizations 
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that, because of their own characteristics or to the characteristics of the population, are 
unable to obtain these resources, will find it more difficult to survive. 
With regard to the variables used, the saturation level can highlight certain situations 
that may not have been revealed by other variables. In this way, if the potential demand 
for resources increases at a slower rate than does the size of the niche, the level of 
competition will be reduced and the probability of survival will be greater. On the other 
hand, if the potential demand increases faster than the increase in the size of the niche, 
then competition will be greater and the probability of survival will be reduced. Lastly, 
if both parameters increase at the same rate, both the level of competition and the 
probability of survival could remain constant. These different situations could explain 
the results obtained in other research, which has used only the component mass to 
specify competition within the population (Barnett and Carroll, 1987; Barnett and 
Amburgey, 1990; Baum and Mezias, 1992; Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992; Hannan 
and Carroll, 1992; Barnett, 1997; Ingram and Baum, 1997; Boone, Bröcheler and 
Carroll, 2000). 
Despite what has been mentioned above, our results do not question the validity of the 
models developed in organizational ecology based exclusively on population size. In 
fact, the validity of the model based on the influence of density on the competitive 
environment and, in turn, on the mortality rates of a population (Hannan, 1989; Hannan 
and Carroll, 1992) is confirmed. This ratifies the importance of density as a key 
competitive dimension that must not be forgotten when attempting to explain the vital 
rates of an industry. 
Concentration has already been researched in organizational ecology, although the aim 
and reasoning are of a different nature (Carroll, 1985; Barnett and Carroll, 1987; 
Wholey, Chrisianson and Sanchez, 1992; Barnett, 1997). However, from our new point 
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of view, the effects of concentration could be examined from two angles. On one hand, 
concentration can be taken as a measure of organizational size inequality. In this case, 
increases in concentration are converted into greater differences in size of the 
organizations of a population. As the difference in size implies a difference in strategies, 
organizational structures and combinations of resources, this means a reduction in 
competition (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). On the other hand, concentration can be 
taken as the degree of control that organizations have on the environmental resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This would imply that an increase in concentration would 
reduce the control of resources to fewer organizations and, consequently, reduce the 
possibilities of survival of the rest of the members. The results obtained favor the 
second approach and reject the reasoning proposed by Hannan and Freeman (1977). 
Regarding the particular characteristics of organizations, one of the variables studied in 
this research is the organization’s ownership structure. The results obtained support the 
reasoning put forward in the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), 
institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983) and 
organizational ecology (Hannan and Carroll, 1992). That is, those organizations able to 
obtain a greater degree of social rather than institutional legitimation, together with the 
certainty of securing a supply of resources, are more likely to survive than those that 
have been unable to do so. In this way, according to the particular characteristics of this 
study, mutual companies seem to be more likely to survive than stock companies. 
It is worth drawing attention to the possibilities for those institutions that are able to 
create or modify the environment. For example, government policy could make 
resource production, or access to it, easier; it could institutionally favor or penalize 
certain organizational characteristics; create public opinion that legitimizes or 
delegitimizes groups of organizations, etc. It would be interesting to analyze how all 
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these institutional changes affect the saturation of the niche and, in a direct way, the 
probability of survival. 
In any case, and despite the opposing results obtained in the second hypothesis, we 
believe that the theories mentioned in this paper are not conflicting, but are 
complementary, and we must not confine ourselves exclusively to one of them. As has 
been previously mentioned, the initial suppositions coincide totally, and it is only the 
diversity of nuances that they provide that enhances the analysis, although they, in 
themselves, are a minor source of conflict. 
1 Concentration has already been researched in organizational ecology, although with a different aim and 
the reasoning. Carroll (1985) uses the concentration level as a fundamental predictive variable to analyze 
the relationships between organizations with a different niche width, establishing that concentration 
allows us to determine whether generalist and specialist organizations compete directly. There are also 
other organizational ecology papers that use this variable as a control (Barnett and Carroll, 1987; Wholey, 
Christianson and Sanchez, 1992; Barnett, 1997), but they do not analyze its influence in any great depth. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of niche size 1944-1998
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Years
N
ic
he
 s
iz
e 
(i
n 
t o
liv
es
)
  
32 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Population mass of Jaen´s olive oil production industry 1944-1998
0
3000
6000
9000
12000
15000
18000
21000
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Years
M
illin
g 
ca
pa
cit
y (
in 
t/8
h)
  
33 
 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of number of olive oil mills 1944-1998 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Years
D
en
sit
y 
(to
ta
l n
um
be
r o
f m
ill
s i
n 
Ja
en
)
  
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Saturation levels of niche 1944-1998
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Figure 5. Concentration levels in Jaen's olive oil production industry 1944-1998
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations  
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Saturation level of niche 405962.5 311026.2           
2. Mutual organization .3045 .4602 .11          
3. Level of concentration .0027 .0013 .14 .39         
4. Type of production ownership .8334 .3725 –.03 .20 .07        
5. Organizational size 15.23 21.12 .16 .40 .55 .10       
6. Organizational age 37.26 23.92 .08 .03 .26 -.05 .06      
7. Obsolete technology .8750 .3307 –.18 –.28 –.57 –.08 –.53 -.08     
8. Advanced technology .0900 .2861 .17 .25 .54 .07 .41 -.07 -.83    
9. Energy cost 3.22 4.38 .29 .35 .90 .06 .58 -.25 -.64 .61   
10. Density 754.51 295.74 –.00 –.34 –.94 –.09 –.47 -.23 .47 -.44 -.75  
11. (Density)2/1000 656.75 424.10 .03 -.31 -.90 -.10 -.43 -.21 .43 -.40 -.68 .99 
Correlations ³ |0.01| are significant at p < 0.00001 
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Table 2 
Piecewise Exponential Models in the Olive Oil Production Industry, 1944–1998(a) 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Saturation level of niche 1.03E-06**** 
(2.9E-07) 
  1.05E-06**** 
(2.9E-07) 
Level of concentration  3263.4**** 
(509.7) 
 3252.51**** 
(501.9) 
Mutual organization    -.702**** 
(.132) 
-.708**** 
(.132) 
Organizational age -.003 
(.002) 
-.0009 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.0001 
(.002) 
Type of production ownership -.307** 
(.101) 
-.306** 
(.101) 
-.202* 
(.102) 
-.202* 
(.102) 
Organizational size -.114**** 
(.009) 
-.115**** 
(.009) 
-.103**** 
(.009) 
-.105**** 
(.009) 
Obsolete technology -.065 
(.386) 
-.020 
(.387) 
-.063 
(.386) 
-.016 
(.388) 
Advanced technology -1.49** 
(.538) 
-1.54** 
(.539) 
-1.38* 
(.538) 
-1.42** 
(.539) 
Energy cost .025 
(.041) 
-.239**** 
(.064) 
.087* 
(.036) 
-.294**** 
(.066) 
Density .017**** 
(.003) 
.038**** 
(.004) 
.021**** 
(.003) 
.034**** 
(.004) 
(Density)2/1000 -.013**** 
(.002) 
-.020**** 
(.002) 
-.015**** 
(.002) 
-.018**** 
(.002) 
Chi-squared (c2) 430.41**** 452.20**** 449.73**** 498.22**** 
Degrees of freedom 9 9 9 11 
**** = p < 0.0001; *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01: * = p < 0.05 
(a) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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